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ABSTRACT 
 
Different scientific traditions represent different epistemological perspectives, and the scientific perspective 
that you advocate will govern the way in which you view what is being investigated, e.g. a natural science 
approach would have a completely different focus from a social science one. Since the 1600s, the heyday of 
rationalism, and towards the twenty-first century, different philosophical directions have developed either 
as a result of the historical–cultural context of which the philosophers have been a part, or as a reaction to 
the worldview and/or the dominant political situation in society at the current time. Based on clear 
connections with both rationalism and empiricism, in this paper I attempt to clarify public health research 
by a more extended understanding of the concept of rationalism. The discussion is based on Bent 
Flyvbjerg’s book Rationality and Power (1991), in which the author reflects on how the criteria of good 
science were seen in the light of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues. The essence in Flyvbjerg’s analysis can be 
seen as social science research needing to distance itself from approaches using natural science’s episteme 
(knowledge), rather than initiating creative thought processes to develop satisfying methods to investigate 
humans and society in the direction of phronesis (wisdom). 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Public health is an interdisciplinary field which 
may be illuminated both through medical research 
and social science. Medical research has 
traditionally been placed in a natural science 
tradition, based on quantitative measurements, 
whereas both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods may be applied to social science. The aim 
of this paper is to shed light on the two scientific 
traditions that have contributed to the development 
of public health research as we know it today, and 
from this draw some lines towards a more extensive 
approach for achieving adequate knowledge in the 
field of public health. In the following section, I 
therefore will begin by elucidating some historical 
connections from the origin of natural science in 
the 1600s - until today. 
 
2. RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 
 
2.1 Rationalism - knowledge through nature 
 
Galileo Galilie’s (AD 1564–1642, commonly known 
as Galileo) interpretation of sunspots was seen as a 
threat to the foundation of traditional natural 
philosophy, which had been handed down from 
Aristotle (384–322 BC) and later modernized by the 
scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages. The 
ancient orthodox belief system of physical nature, 
and the principle that heavenly bodies had a 
different base to earth, was challenged by Galileo’s 
observations and theories [1]. Before the scientific 
revolution, traditional physics had a human-like 
character, and explained physical occurrences based 
on natural movements, whereas the modern natural 
scientists of the 1600s chose to view nature as a 
machine.  
 
The ‘natural philosophers’ in the 1600s had various 
perspectives in their worldview; some defended 
rational theory, whereas others developed a 
programme based on an un-theoretical collection of 
facts and experimentation. In other words, the term 
‘nature’ was understood in different ways. In regard 
to this, Shapin (1996) points to Francis Bacon 
(1561–1626), who reformed natural theory to 
include synthetic products, and to Rene Descartes 
(1596–1650), who claimed that there was no 
difference between machines created by craftsmen 
and those created by nature itself.  
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However, Shapin (1996) is critical of the 
understanding that the science of the 1600s was 
transformed to the ‘modern world’ instantaneously 
through various scientific revolutions, and chooses 
instead to see scientific development as a natural 
and continuous process. Even if Shapin argues 
against the existence of scientific revolution, there 
has been a great development within natural science 
since the heyday of rationalism in the 1600s – since 
Descartes, who denied that common sense and 
consciousness were the source of true knowledge, 
and how it is seen in the present day. It can be said 
that Descartes’ scientific philosophy is the basis of 
modern natural science in the west, which is 
stressed by the philosopher Hans Skjervheim 
(1996), who claims that the modern sciences have 
evolved within a more or less cartesian horizon. 
Descartes’ body/soul dualism has had a strong 
influence on the western conception of nature and 
natural sciences, and in our relationship with 
nature. This attitude of objectifying and observing 
from afar, where human (subject) stands above 
nature (object), legitimizes the new thinking in 
natural science [2] and, for example, reproductive 
technology, euthanasia, cosmetic surgery and 
medicalization may be used to exemplify different 
ways in which humans have control over nature in 
today’s society. The focus on public health issues, 
e.g. obesity, physical activity, lifestyle diseases, 
dieting, is another current example of control 
patterns.  
 
Descartes’ dualism is commonly criticized, because 
in this we see humans in contrast to and not as part 
of nature [3]. In its extension, the human as a 
spiritual being (the soul) is seen outside natural 
science. In contrast to cartesian epistemology, John 
Locke claimed that the body was of much more 
importance compared with other epistemologies 
emphasizing the soul or mind – and this perspective 
may have been the seed to inspire many over the 
last few decades in their arguments for an 
expansion of this narrow term to include practical 
and physical expertise as well [4]. According to 
Locke, physical education was of primary 
importance for developing an educational 
foundation. In this regard, the professions of crafts 
and medical sciences might be appropriate 
examples from today’s society – as the learning 
process occurs through action and often without 
verbal communication.  
 
Based on these considerations, public health 
research may be placed in a rationalistic scientific 
perspective. However, on the basis of the many 
different methodological approaches being used in 
medical studies, it can also be linked to a different 
scientific philosophy, namely empiricism.  
 
2.2 Empiricism - knowledge through experience 
 
Empiricism emerged in the 1700s, and is often 
referred to as being in contrast to rationalism. It 
advocates that experience is a prerequisite of 
knowledge, and has had a strong influence on the 
western world, especially within medicine and parts 
of the social sciences. The philosopher David 
Hume (1711–1776) was unambiguously empirical 
in his thinking, and claimed that true knowledge 
was based on the experience of the senses. Hume 
was particularly known for his observations and 
interpretations of induction and causation, where 
you draw conclusions from the individual to the 
general, from single observations to generalized 
conclusions (theory). Empiricism initially had a 
scientific approach that was investigated in the 
1800s and 1900s and was used on society through 
positivism.  
 
Positivism occurred as a result of August Comte 
(1798–1857), the founder of sociology, who wished 
to separate contemporary social philosophy from its 
theoretical and metaphysical condition, and create a 
science that could formulate general and 
comprehensive laws for the constant relationships 
between phenomena being investigated. This was 
introduced by positivism through an empirical 
mind-set for social phenomena. Positivism involves 
a certain understanding of experience and 
recognition, and the meaning of true knowledge, 
and can consider natural, human, social and cultural 
phenomena. The basic philosophy in this tradition, 
‘Wienerkretsen’, was brought forth in the 1920s in 
what was named social positivism. The logical 
positivists thought that distinction is about 
observation and facts, independent of theory, and 
theory is dependent on observation and facts. 
According to Gilje (1987), theoretical statements 
must be reduced to observational statements to be 
meaningful and have legitimate scientific status [5].  
 
Common to all empirical directions is that they had 
the same main epistemological thought, the thesis 
of singular science: all science follows one and the 
same pattern, namely that of the natural sciences. 
Physics was the ideal for all science, and the same 
methodological approach was used when speaking 
of natural or social phenomena. The goal was that 
all fields should acquire the mind-set of physics and 
render the laws of nature in an exact, objective 
form. Empirical data are therefore actually based on 
the experience of what can be observed and is 
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measurable, i.e. what can be counted, weighed and 
measured – and this implies a certain measure of 
natural science within the ‘camps of social science’. 
 
2.3 Public health research 
 
Traditionally, modern natural science has been 
concerned with ‘objective’ quantified information, 
and tied to the inner processes of the body obtained 
through equipment. Precision and accuracy are the 
goal, and measurable relationships and numerical 
values from tests create diagnostics that can be used 
to motivate patients, in choosing treatment, and for 
considering the effect. This development helps to 
maintain the distinction between body and 
experience, body and person, and confirms the idea 
of the distinct separation between the thinking 
subject and the objective body. By claiming that 
scientific knowledge can be developed only 
through physical, observable and measurable 
phenomena, the empirical directions consider the 
body as pure science (a natural phenomenon). 
 
Even though natural science may be a crucial 
prerequisite for adequate and proper healthcare 
generally, this has been discussed critically in the 
last few decades [6], and it might therefore be 
inadequate. Natural science is crucial in the field of 
healthcare, but it can hardly shed light on the 
subject’s compound and social character, or its 
dimensions of opinion. It is argued that medicine is 
a humanitarian science, because the subject in 
medicine is sick people. However, if medical 
subjects also could be explained through 
humanitarian disciplines, this would require a 
breach of the empiricist/positivist inheritance: a 
breach with lack of recognition that disparate 
phenomena exist in the world. This understanding 
is supported by Schrödinger (1951), who claimed 
that the scope, measure and value of natural science 
are the same as those of any other branch of human 
knowledge. None has any value or scope on its 
own, only when seen as a whole. The main 
responsibility of natural science must be to expand 
our understanding of the ‘reality’ that surrounds us 
and to contribute to a greater understanding of 
ourselves in the world [7]. 
 
Foucault (2012) is also critical towards the ideal of 
objectivity in modern medicine, and argues that 
medical knowledge through history was revealed 
through experience-based situations rather than 
through reading books [8]. He claims that we are 
too concerned with objective measurements to 
diagnose rather than through seeing and listening to 
the individual. This criticism is supported by Mol 
(2002), who revealed that surgical considerations 
often preceded the clinical ones, although a clinical 
approach would have been the most effective and 
gentle for the individual [9]. This view is supported 
Moser (2011), who demonstrated the importance of 
continuous processing and articulation of treatment 
methods to further develop proper practice for 
patients with dementia [10]. Furthermore, based on 
exceedingly international focus on incorporating 
results reported by patients into clinical research, 
also Kayes and McPherson (2010) question 
whether objectivity is synonymous with good 
science. For example, they claim that an increasing 
awareness and utilization of mathematically sound 
techniques within the science of movement, such as 
responsive theory, Rasch analysis [11], have made 
it possible to develop solid self-reported methods of 
measurement with as good a quality as that of more 
traditional measurements [12].  
 
Hawker et al. (2002) claim that qualitative 
approaches within medical science are crucial 
because this tradition would be focused on patients 
and caretakers. This research would focus on e.g. 
patients’ experiences with disease and treatment, to 
what degree concrete medical studies were useful, 
patients’ and caretakers’ behaviour and attitude, 
why some patients were unable to complete 
treatment, etc. However, according to Hawker et 
al., this knowledge cannot be found through 
evidence-based medicine. Nonetheless, qualitative 
research must improve its own methods and 
analysis to be included in evidence-based research 
[13].  
 
Based on the aforementioned, the area of public 
health research is constantly criticized by various 
sources, depending on from what type of 
‘scientific–philosophical’ viewpoint it is seen. The 
social positivists are criticized by philosophers and 
researchers who are more qualitatively oriented (as 
being ‘disloyal’ towards their own through use of 
scientific methods on humans and society), whereas 
scientists with a qualitative perspective (to the 
extent that we can use the term ‘qualitative’ in 
terms of natural scientists), criticize the most 
extreme evidence-based research methods within 
their own tradition. Having said this, it is exactly 
this discussion via critical analysis and claims that 
brings forth natural science. In summary, we may 
conclude that healthcare professionals may be 
considered to be constantly at the interface of 
natural science, social science and the humanities. 
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3. AN EXTENDED AND MORE 
COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE TERM ‘RATIONALISM’  
 
Earlier, I attempted to clarify the main attributes 
within rationalism and empiricism, and based on 
these considerations we can justify describing 
rationalism as a pure scientific tradition, which 
bases its knowledge on pure quantitative 
measurements from the external controlled 
condition to the object being studied, whereas 
empiricism represents a tradition in the social 
sciences that wants to explain social relationships 
using scientific methods. Both of these scientific 
traditions are concerned with this description, but 
with quantitative approaches as the field of 
investigation. Qualitative approaches, i.e. a detailed 
description of relationships based on subjective 
meaning in the relationship between people and 
their surroundings (society), are left in these models 
of explanation in humanistic or other traditions of 
social science.  
 
In the following, I will try to shed light on the 
possible transitions from the traditional rationalism 
described above, to a philosophical view on 
rationalism that can be said to further and more 
extensively represent an understanding of the 
possibilities that lie in this tradition, in relation to, 
among other things, public health research. I have 
based this work on Flyvbjerg’s book Rationality 
and Power (1991), and his reflections on what 
should be the criteria for good science, based on 
Aristotle’s intellectual deeds: episteme, techne and 
phronesis.  
 
Flyvbjerg (1991) claims that the most important 
task in Aristotle’s studies of humans and society 
was to develop the rational value system in society 
balanced against the development of science and 
technical rationality. Aristotle considered the 
rational value system to be the most crucial one, 
and claimed that this should govern the latter. 
According to Flyvbjerg, this understanding has 
changed, and the more current focus has been on 
the technical and analytical rationality within 
science and society. He claims, however, that this 
analytical rationality cannot be used on studies of 
humans and society, because empirical sociology 
has not yet been possible.  
 
Flyvbjerg seeks alternatives to the rational 
dominance that has held out since the heyday of 
positivism in the mid-1900s, and argue that we 
instead should return via ‘the rational turn’ and 
learn through the past how we can re-formulate the 
rational to be more comprehensive. In relation to 
this, he points out that the founders of rationalism 
(Plato, Socrates and Aristotle) probably had a more 
nuanced and varied understanding of the 
possibilities of humans gaining knowledge about 
themselves and their surroundings than is the case 
in modern society – and points out that it is 
predominantly the interpretations by later 
generations that have made the old Greeks the 
founders of rationalism. With this, Flyvbjerg 
suggests the same as Shapin (1996), namely that we 
should be careful about drawing conclusions 
through interpretations from the past because these 
could be based on incorrect assumptions.  
 
We can clearly understand Flyvbjerg as an anti-
positivist when he expresses his scientific view; 
that modern rational understanding, leading back to 
Descartes (the technical–analytical view), cannot be 
used within social science. This criticism of 
positivism can also be found in Skjervheim (1996). 
According to Asdal (2005), Skjervheim’s criticism 
of positivism has been about explaining the main 
distinction between natural science and the science 
of humans, and that with this he has marked a 
distinction between humans and animals, humans 
and nature. She further claims that Skjervheim’s 
criticism of positivism was also a criticism of 
singular science, the belief that all phenomena 
could be studied through the method of natural 
science [14]. Skjervheim thereby criticized the 
positivism of using natural science on humans, and 
this criticism has contributed to the establishment 
of its own scientific forum for the disciplines of 
social science and humanism, with human actors 
and interactions as the subject matter (Skjervheim, 
2002, discussed in Asdal, 2005, p 254).  
 
In addition to the criticism on positivism, Flyvbjerg 
also suggests a distinction between the rationalist 
understanding that was applied by Aristotle in 
ancient times, and the rationalist worldview that 
characterizes modern natural science. This 
understanding mirrors Shapin (1996), who claims 
that the natural philosophers of the 1600s distanced 
themselves from the divine perspective in their 
interpretation of natural phenomena. Unlike Shapin, 
who provides a descriptive representation of 
scientific development based on ancient times, 
Flyvbjerg is concerned with going back in time, all 
the way back to Aristotle’s philosophy, in an 
attempt to explain the complex relationship 
between natural and social sciences.  
 
In the next section, I try to convey Flyvbjerg’s 
thoughts about what we can learn from the current 
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situation in the society based on Aristotle’s three 
virtues. 
 
3.1 Episteme: a theoretical, quantitative 
approach 
 
Episteme (knowledge) is equivalent to the ideal 
modern science, and comes close to being the only 
legitimate understanding of what true science is in 
the twenty-first century. This activity includes 
invariable knowledge building on a slight 
connection between theoretical basic science and 
practical applied science. Intellectual activities, 
according to this perception, will not be true 
science, but would strive to legitimize themselves 
according to this ideal [15]. 
 
Based on this description, it is legitimate to view 
episteme as a quantitative approach in its area of 
public health research. Quantitative research 
(natural science) will be understood here not as an 
intellectual activity, because one stands in an outer 
relationship to those objects being investigated. In 
this lie observations, measurement of physiological 
factors in laboratory research, the relationship 
between cause and effect in quantitative social 
studies, and more. Modern medical research, 
whether speaking of clinical studies on patients in 
the statistical probability calculations of hospitals, 
showing different tendencies in a population (e.g. 
probability of cancer diagnosis if you smoke more 
than 10 cigarettes a day) or of the significance of 
exercise for people with high blood pressure, etc., 
can, according to this understanding, be defined as 
episteme.  
 
It must, however, be pointed out that Flyvbjerg is 
critical of the interpretation of episteme as natural 
science. He means, as mentioned earlier, that social 
science must liberate itself from carrying natural 
science as its scientific ideal, and that there should 
be a compromise including a reflective and distinct 
development of its role from episteme to phronesis. 
 
3.2 Techne and phronesis: poetic and practical 
approaches to knowledge 
 
Flyvbjerg (1991) claims that ‘techne’ and 
‘phronesis’ are terms that include intellectual work, 
and that both are related to Aristotle’s notion of 
truth. Techne (know how/craft) involves the usage 
of practical rationality in relation to solving 
concrete problems, and is a skill that can be 
learned. Examples of techne are arts and crafts. The 
goal in this practice is the production of a thing; it 
is concrete, variable and an activity dependent on 
context. Its goal uses technical knowledge and 
skills based on a pragmatic middle rationality, by 
which I mean practical, goal oriented and solution 
oriented. In relation to this, one should be aware the 
time that Aristotle shaped these philosophical 
thoughts around, e.g. techne. What societal role did 
the production of arts and crafts have in ancient 
times, and what type of recognition did these 
products gain? These are questions that cannot be 
given an exact answer, but in literature we find that 
it was often about physical skill production aimed 
at a certain product, e.g. the ability to express life 
experiences through a piece of art or poetry. The 
purpose of these products would therefore be hard 
to transfer and understand in the context of today’s 
society. 
 
Phronesis puts practical knowledge and ethics in 
the centre, and deals with an analysis of values as a 
basis for action. This assumes an interaction 
between the general and the concrete. The basis of 
phronetic research is an analysis of the relationship 
between values and interests, with the hindsight of 
societal action, people and politics. By politics here 
is meant what relates to mutual human relationships 
as members of society and ensuring the interest of 
the group. Phronesis cannot be defined by universal 
rules, and application of this virtue demands 
evaluation assessment and selection – in other 
words experience [15]. 
 
Is it possible, based on Flyvbjerg’s definition of 
these two virtues as intellectual activities, to 
assume that they each in their own way represent 
qualitative approaches within public health 
research? By qualitative approach is meant an 
activity that obviously distinguishes itself from the 
distanced and objectified quantitative approach 
defined as empiricism, which implies that we try to 
approach what we wish to investigate with an open 
and humble mind, that we attempt to grasp the 
meaningful content within our own context, and 
that we use evaluation/interpretation/judgement to 
gain a deeper understanding of the situation.  
 
Seen in the light of Flyvbjerg’s clear division of the 
episteme as a pure scientific concept without 
intellectual qualities, it can seem obvious that 
phronesis, in this activity, implies 
knowledge/wisdom based on moral considerations 
and practical experience, and can be utilized as a 
qualitative research method in its search for 
knowledge. In relation to techne, however, which 
among other things deals with technical insight and 
problem solving, the characteristics of this activity 
may in modern times be tied to more quantitative 
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properties. However, as mentioned earlier, one 
should probably be careful with interpretations of 
the concepts from Aristotle’s time in the context of 
our own time, because the meaning and 
understanding of the content would probably have 
been entirely different in ancient times. Based on 
this, I think that we can argue in favour of 
legitimizing techne as an intellectual virtue that in 
our time can be understood as a qualitative 
approach to public health research.  
 
3.3 The significance of the three virtues in public 
health research 
 
Flyvbjerg (1991) claims that there are few 
researchers who have reflected on the strengths and 
weaknesses of social science in relation to their 
roles as episteme, techne and phronesis, and that 
this will be the first step towards development of 
the study of humans and society. He points out that 
currently researchers seldom define whether they 
we do one or the other, and it is called science even 
though they are entirely different activities. He 
further claims that social scientists are not 
especially interested in methodology – something 
he argues they should be. One important reason for 
this is that he seeks the development of guidelines 
for the interpretation of intellectual virtues in 
relation to studies of humans and society. Activities 
that are initially techne or phronesis are rationalized 
as if they were episteme – something that adds to 
the uncertainty of what social science is and can do 
[15]. One example of this can be found with the 
empiricists who advocate the theory of singular 
science, i.e. that a natural scientific approach and 
method can be used for all types of studies. If we 
should try to transfer this thought to modern 
medical science, we could, for example, point to the 
evidence-based medicine that is criticized by many 
for generalization without proper validity [10, 16, 
17]. 
 
According to Flyvbjerg (1991), social science is 
strongest where natural science is most weak, 
namely in the role of phronesis. In the extension of 
this, he claims that natural science cannot 
contribute significantly to the reflection of analysis 
and discussion of values and interests which he sees 
as a requirement for an enlightened cultural, 
economic, political and social development in every 
society. Social science contributes as techne in 
relation to social-, cultural-, demographic- and 
administrative problems in society, but it is in the 
role of phronesis and techne it can counterbalance 
relativism and nihilism. If we were to try to relate 
these reflections to public health research, we 
could, for example, go from the strictly objective 
evidence-based approach in relation to research, the 
epistemic activity, and complement this with 
qualitative approaches, which can then either take 
place as techne, e.g. in relation to the development 
of a new system of measurement – a technical 
insight/solution-oriented activity – or as phronesis – 
in seeking in-depth knowledge of the primary needs 
of multiple disabilities in deeper analysis.  
 
Flyvbjerg finally claims that social science, as a 
result of having tried to practise using an epistemic 
approach, has failed in its rhetoric and its results. 
There will still, however, be room for social science 
as a techne, e.g. in relation to the welfare and 
treatment of registration, administration, control, 
management and redistribution of resources 
between sectors of the population in society. 
Furthermore, he thinks that it should be a 
compromise, with the role of social science as 
episteme including a reflective and clear 
development of its role as phronesis. The purpose 
of this type of study of humans and society is not a 
development in theory, but a contribution to 
society’s practical rationality considering where we 
are, where we are going and what we wish for 
according to different values, interests, etc. The 
purpose will then be to contribute to society’s 
capacity for rational thinking and action, and can 
perish either with the help of empirical analysis or 
by the evaluations of practical philosophers – or, at 
best, through a combination of these [15]. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Scientific theory is a comprehensive field in which 
one can easily get lost, and there are a variety of 
philosophical considerations and opinions on how 
one should approach seeking new knowledge. In 
this paper I wanted to shed light on the roots of 
scientific theory, which are the foundation of public 
health research in modern times, and to try to 
clarify what guidelines and possibilities are 
applicable to this research tradition. The essence of 
Flyvbjerg’s analysis can be seen in that public 
health research in social science must distance itself 
from approaches in natural science episteme, and 
instead initiate creative thought processes to 
develop satisfying methods for investigating 
humans and society in the direction of phronesis. 
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